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Abstract 
Two recent contributions to this journal discuss a challenge to Stanford’s time-
lapse embryo monitoring patent, currently before the European Patent Office 
(EPO). Sterckx, Cockbain and Pennings (2017) would like to keep the 
morphokinetics of embryo division in the public domain; they argue that time-
lapse monitoring (TLM) is a diagnostic method in the sense of European patent 
law and therefore unpatentable. In response, Pearce (2017) suggests that the 
jurisprudence of the EPO unambiguously says that TLM is not a diagnostic 
method. This commentary proposes an alternative legal ground for challenging 
patents relating to the principle of TLM, a ground that could be invoked before 
national courts and, ultimately, the Court of Justice of the European Union: TLM 
is not a diagnostic procedure but a process of selection that breaches the criterion 
of dignity in European patent law. 
 
 
 
Lawyers and economists have long argued that patents serve the public interest by 
incentivizing innovation and promoting investment in technological development (for 
a sceptical analysis of this theory see Mirowski [2011]). Recent contributions to this 
journal consider whether time-lapse embryo monitoring patents are justifiable in these 
terms. An earlier exchange highlighted the foundational question of patent law: what 
quality of technical intervention is required to turn a natural phenomenon into a 
patentable invention? Is the duration of a cell cycle ‘an indisputable and well-known 
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fact of nature’ (Cohen 2013, p. 109), or does patent protection enable the basic 
science of TLM to be ‘translated’ into an invention with clinical applications (Reijo 
Pera 2013, p. 114)? In the European context, the question whether TLM patents 
respect the proper mission of patents is framed in terms of the exclusion of 
‘diagnostic procedures’ from patentability. The opposition before the European Patent 
Office (EPO) argues that Stanford’s patent encompasses a diagnostic procedure 
practised on the human body, and that it should therefore remain in the public 
domain. Before proposing an alternative ground of opposition, one should notice that 
the ability of any particular purveyor of TLM to secure market dominance, and hence 
to curtail the benefits of competition, might have less to do with patent protection than 
with the adroit exploitation of trademarks and branding strategies. 
 
Of all the procedures used in fertility clinics, TLM is the only one that is proposed to 
patients under the ensign of a brand name. Practitioners have their go-to brands of, 
say, culture media, mineral oil, or embryo transfer catheter, all duly acknowledged in 
the writing up of research findings, but these brand names are not advertised to 
patients. So, it is striking to notice just how prominently the trademarks Eeva or 
Embryoscope feature on the websites of leading fertility clinics, set in texts that 
encourage the belief that TLM improves success rates. The website of one UK 
fertility clinic suggests — inaccurately — that the first baby to be born from a cycle 
involving Eeva was ‘named after the test that gave her life’ (GRCM, 2017; on the 
point of inaccuracy, see BBC Scotland [2013]). The market presentation of Eeva 
technology encourages patients to make the imaginary leap forward to the ‘best’ 
embryo, to the baby-to-be that will feature in the home movie version of the 
embryological time-lapse record. This ‘puffery’, to use the old legal term, goes on 
despite the fact that there is no conclusive evidence that TLM produces the benefit 
that really matters to patients; namely, enhanced pregnancy rates (Kieslinger et al., 
2016). If TLM does produce a 20% improvement in implantation rates (Meseguer et 
al., 2013), it is still unclear to what extent this might be attributable to incubation 
conditions rather than the applied science of morphokinetics. A recent commentary 
drew attention to the ‘hype’ surrounding the technology, and to the methodological 
limitations of the studies on which claims about the effectiveness of TLM are based 
(Armstrong et al., 2015). Four fertility specialists responded with the observation that 
it was the duty of embryologists and physicians to ‘stand back and inform patients on 
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the real benefit from any medical innovation’, in this case TLM (Basile et al., 2015). 
One of the co-authors was a practitioner whose clinic actively promotes the virtues of 
Embryoscope and whose research papers have done much to generate the impression 
that TLM techniques do improve success rates. This says much about the complicity 
between marketing imperatives and clinical science in the promotion of TLM. We 
know that fertility clinics are in the business of hope, and TLM is a particularly 
striking example of how hope is leveraged in a clinical context, technically and 
economically.  
  
Nonetheless, the question of patentability remains crucial, and this commentary 
proposes an alternative basis for opposing the patenting of TLM in Europe. Instead of 
characterising the differentiation of ‘good-quality’ embryos from ‘poor-quality’ 
embryos as a diagnostic procedure, why not see it as a process of selection that 
breaches the patent law criterion of dignity? In Brüstle v Greenpeace (2011), the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that inventions that ‘used’ 
human embryos for ‘industrial or commercial purposes’ were not patentable in the 
European Union. The decision was based on the premise that European patent law 
excluded patentability ‘where respect for human dignity could be affected’ (paragraph 
34). The court held that ‘any human ovum must, as soon as fertilised, be regarded as a 
‘human embryo’ …since that fertilisation is such as to commence the process of 
development of a human being’. So, although they are only ‘potential’ human beings, 
embryos are imbued with full human dignity. It inevitably follows that the destruction 
of an embryo breaches the principle of dignity. The stem cell patent in Brüstle did not 
actually prescribe the destruction of embryos, but the CJEU held that one had to look 
beyond the ‘technical teaching’ of the patent to what was necessary for the working of 
the invention. And, although stem cells might ‘live again’, as part of the colony that 
manufactures tissues of interest, the embryo from which they were derived would 
necessarily have been ‘destroyed’.  
 
This might be a reason for suggesting that TLM patents contravene the patent law 
criterion of dignity. Although Stanford’s patent does not ‘teach’ a process of 
destruction, embryo selection implies the destruction of ‘poor-quality’ embryos. 
Statistics compiled by the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
reveal that of the 3.5 million embryos created in UK fertility clinics between 1991 and 
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2012, 1.7 million were destroyed, presumably because they were not considered 
suitable for transfer or cryopreservation, or because of patient preference (for the 
statistics see Hansard, 2013). If used within an elective single-embryo transfer 
protocol, TLM might not immediately lead to destruction. The process of selection 
would merely indicate the order in which embryos should be implanted in a 
succession of one fresh and potentially multiple frozen transfers. Although most of 
the embryos that undergo a process of selection will be destroyed, proponents of TLM 
patents might say that this statistical fact does not mean that embryo selection 
‘necessitates’ — in the sense of Brüstle — the destruction of embryos. For example, 
prospective parents could, if they wished, decide to maintain their ‘spare’ embryos in 
a state of permanent cryogenic suspension. Or state regulatory bodies could intervene 
to mandate the same result. So perhaps the fate of spare embryos is, from the 
perspective of patent law, an externality.  
 
But the patent law principle of dignity is breached even before the ultimate decision is 
made, in and by the very process of, selection. Time-lapse evaluation compromises 
dignity because the embryos in a cohort are treated not as ends in themselves but as a 
means to the selection of the ‘best’ candidate for transfer. The ‘value’ of each embryo 
is not inherent, fixed by and from the moment of fertilization; it is contingent on the 
outcome of evaluation and selection. The embryonic person’s nature and destiny – its 
‘life chances’, so to speak – are dependent on how it measures up to the other 
members of cohort and to the software-generated ‘reference embryo’. In Europe, there 
are obvious historical reasons why procedures for the selection of the fittest are 
thought to involve a fundamental disregard for human dignity. According to EPO 
jurisprudence, ‘morality’ is the ‘totality of the accepted norms which are deeply 
rooted in …European society and civilisation’ (EPO 1995). Although few Europeans 
have read Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, the notion that persons are ends in 
themselves has been effectively ‘translated’ from the philosophical treatise into the 
basic ethical intuitions of Europeans. Interestingly, Sperling (2013, pp 152–168) 
suggests that Kantian principles are ingrained in German folk knowledge). And, by 
holding that human embryos have dignity from the moment of fertilization, the 
decision in Brüstle wrote this particular sense of dignity into European patent law. It 
gave legal form to the intuition that there is a decisive ethical difference between the 
‘grown’ and the ‘made’ (Habermas, 2003), or between treating persons as though they 
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were unique by nature and treating them as though their worth depended upon their 
fitness for some socially or technically defined purpose.  
 
In its initial ruling on the challenge to Stanford’s patent the European Patent Office 
followed the reasoning in Brüstle to the extent of holding that an embryo is a ‘human 
body’, but it did not follow Brüstle through to its logical conclusion. In asking 
whether TLM qualified as a diagnostic method it individualized the embryo by asking 
whether ‘it’ was the subject of certain diagnostic steps. It thereby overlooked the fact 
that evaluation is an inherently comparative process, which begins with a cohort of 
embryos and measures the respective ‘quality’ or ‘viability’ of each by reference to an 
ideal model of morphokinetic stages (which is itself based on archived evaluations of 
thousands of embryos). So, even if one ignores the fact that it results in the 
destruction of most embryos, TLM breaches Brüstle’s criterion of dignity because it 
purports to select the fittest ‘human body’. Indeed, from this perspective, TLM cannot 
be a diagnostic procedure, precisely because it addresses a cohort rather than an 
individual. And the principle of selecting within a cohort is actually invoked in 
support of the argument that TLM patents do not privatise a natural phenomenon: 
‘there is no need to distinguish quality among as many as 5–10 embryos (or even 
more) in natural conception, and in nature women simply do not conceive outside of 
the body’ (Reijo Pera 2013, p. 113). In other words, comparative selection is essential 
to the ‘invention’. 
 
This analysis might seem artificial to anyone familiar with the clinical and emotional 
complexities of the embryo selection process, but the Court in Brüstle emphasized 
that its definition of dignity was confined to patent law. Noting that ‘the definition of 
human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in many Member States’, the judges 
observed that the case did not require them ‘to broach questions of a medical or 
ethical nature’ (see Brüstle, paragraph 40). In particular, the Court emphasized that 
the object was ‘not to regulate the use of human embryos in the context of scientific 
research’ (paragraph 40). So even if TLM were to be deemed unpatentable on this 
basis, clinics would remain entirely free to use TLM, and to market it to patients as 
vigorously as they do now. Patent law invokes ethical principles such as ‘dignity’ or 
‘morality’ only to determine whether a technology can be patented, not whether it is 
ethical actually to implement and practise that technology.  
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 It should be noted, however, that Brüstle develops an expansive conception of dignity. 
Although there were pragmatic reasons for holding that embryos were human from 
the first moment of fertilization (see paragraphs 26–28), the Court reasoned that the 
term ‘human embryo’ had to be understood ‘in a wide sense’ so as to ‘exclude any 
possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity could be affected’ 
(paragraph 34). So, the embryo is not just a potential human being; it possesses full 
human dignity from the moment of fertilization and should be treated accordingly. 
The Court emphasized that ‘all processes which offend against human dignity are 
excluded from patentability’ (Brüstle, paragraph 33). Destruction is self-evidently an 
offence against dignity, but if the embryo is as much entitled to be treated as an end in 
itself as any other human being, then any patented process that treats it as a means 
necessarily offends against dignity. 
 
Although I focus here on its application to time-lapse microscopy patents, one should 
pause to notice the broader implications of Brüstle. By ascribing dignity, not to say 
sanctity, to the fertilized egg, the decision might be said to align the moral compass of 
patent law with the most conservative ethical tendencies in Europe (for a survey of 
European attitudes see Gaskell et al., 2012). So, the price of applying the logic of 
Brüstle to the case of TLM might be to lend symbolic reinforcement to these 
conservative positions. If only for that reason, courts might be reluctant to accept the 
interpretation of Brüstle that is proposed here. But even if the argument here fails as a 
means of opposing the patenting of time-lapse microscopy, it would still have the 
merit of forcing greater clarity in the specification of the quality of dignity that 
European patent law attributes to embryos.  
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